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ÖZET 
Avrupa Birliği’nin İç Pazar projesi önemli ölçüde sınır ötesi satımlara 
dayanmaktadır. Bu resimde tüketiciler, güveninin sağlanması gereken asli 
aktörlerden biri haline gelmektedir. Anketler tüketicilerin, diğerlerinin yanı 
sıra, satış sonrası hizmetlere ilişkin de endişeleri olduğunu göstermektedir. 
Ancak AB yakın zamana kadar bu konuda harekete geçmekten kaçınmıştır. 
2011 tarihli Tüketici Hakları Direktifi değişik tipte tüketici sözleşmeleri için 
satış sonrası hizmetlere ilişkin hükümler ihtiva etmektedir. Bu direktifte 
benimsenen yaklaşım, Komisyon’un 1993 tarihli Tüketici Malları için Ga-
ranti ve Satış Sonrası Hizmetlere ilişkin Yeşil Kitap’ında tartışmaya sunulan 
bilgi-odaklı rejimi yansıtmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Yeşil Kitap’ta önerilen rejim-
leri incelemek ve Tüketici Hakları Direktifi’nde benimsenen metodun potan-
siyelini tüketicinin güveni açısından değerlendirmek amacındadır. Bu bakış 
açısı ile bilgi-merkezli rejimi güçlü kılmanın ve tüm potansiyelini ortaya 
çıkarmanın anahtarı olduğu için, önerilen rejime uyulmasını sağlayacak yol-
lar tespit edilmeye çalışılacaktır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği hukuku, tüketici güveni, tüketici söz-
leşmesi, satış sonrası hizmetler, Tüketici Hakları Direktifi, sınır ötesi ticaret 
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ABSTRACT 
The Internal Market project of the European Union is largely dependent 
on cross-border sales. Consumers in this panorama become one of the vital 
actors, yet whose confidence needs to be maintained. Surveys indicate that 
consumers have concerns regarding the provision of after-sales services, 
inter alia others. Yet the EU avoided acting on it until recently. The 
Consumer Rights Directive of 2011 encompasses provisions regarding after-
sales services in different types of consumer contracts. The approach 
adopted by this Directive reflects the information-based regime, which was 
presented for discussion in the Commission’s Green Paper on Guarantees for 
Consumer Goods and After-sales Services of 1993. This article examines the 
proposed regimes of the Green Paper and explores the potential of the 
method adopted by the Consumer Rights Directive, vis-à-vis consumer 
confidence. In this perspective, a strong compliance with the proposed 
regime will be sought to be maintained, since it is the key to empowering the 
information-oriented regime to reach its potential. 
Keywords: European Union law, consumer confidence, consumer 
contracts, after-sales services, Consumer Rights Directive, cross-border 
trade 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulation of after-sales services for consumer goods within the EU 
framework has been in the EU’s agenda since the beginning of 90’s, hence 
with a fading interest in the area. The 1990-1992 action plan on consumer 
policy of the Commission made a reference to the subject by including 
‘examination of possible initiatives to simplify cross frontier consumer 
contracts, guarantees and after sales service’ into its action plan for the 
period.1 In its following three year action plan, the Commission clearly 
declared its intention to prepare a green paper on guarantees and after-sales 
service conditions, emphasising the significance of the area with reference to 
its key role for the single market, and states that: ‘Transfrontier shopping can 
only flourish if the consumer is assured that he can enjoy the same after-
                                                 
1  Commission (EEC), ‘Three Year Action Plan of Consumer Policy in the EEC (1990-
1992)’ COM (1990) 98 final, 3 May 1990, p.16 
Dr. Deniz Tekin Apaydın 
The EU Regulation On After-Sales Services in The Consumer Rights Directive: 
Missed or Seized The Opportunity? 
5 
sales and guarantee terms no matter where the supplier is domiciled.’2 A few 
months into this declaration, the Green Paper was ready and up for a 
discussion. In spite of the strong argumentation and reference of the Green 
Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-sales Services3 
(hereinafter referred as ‘the Green Paper’) for the subject, it was avoided to 
be enacted. In the Consumer Guarantees Directive of 19994, which is the 
product of the process that started with this Green Paper, it was decided to 
not to regulate the after-sales services. The ambitious Proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive 2008,5 which intended to replace eight of the 
existing consumer protection directives,6 one of which is the Consumer 
Guarantees Directive, with a horizontal approach structure, transformed 
along the way and ended up as the Consumer Rights Directive (the CRD),7 
which only repealed two directives8 and amended further two,9 one of which 
                                                 
2  Commission (EC), ‘Second Commission Three-Year Action Plan (1993-1995)’ COM (93) 
378 final, 28 July 1993, p.26 
3  COM (93) 509 final, 15 November 1993 
4  Council Directive (EC) 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees (the Consumer Guarantees Directive) [1999] OJ L171/12 
5  Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive on consumer rights’ COM (2008) 614 final, 8 
October 2008. This project was the product of the Commission’s Green Paper on the 
Review of the Consumer Acquis, which sought to implement a framework instrument. 
Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis’ COM (2006) 
744 final, 8 February 2007  
6  Council Directive (EEC) 85/577 to protect consumer in respect of contracts negotiated 
away from business premises (the Doorstep Selling Directive) [1985] OJ L372/31; 
Council Directive (EEC) 90/314 on package travel, package holiday and package tours 
(the Package Travel Directive) [1990] OJ L158/59; Council Directive (EEC) 93/13 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts (the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive) 
[1993] OJ L95/29; Council Directive (EC) 94/47 on the protection of purchasers in 
respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use 
immovable properties on a timeshare basis (the Timeshare Directive) [1994] OJ L280/83; 
Council Directive (EC) 97/7 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance 
contracts (the Distance Selling Directive) [1997] OJ L144/19; Council Directive (EC) 
98/6 on consumer protection in the indication of the prices offered to consumers (the Price 
Indications Directive) [1998] OJ L80/27; Directive 98/27/EC (the Injunctions Directive) 
[1998] OJ L166/51; and Council Directive (EC) 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees (the Consumer Guarantees Directive) [1999] 
OJ L171/12 
7  Council Directive (EU) 2011/83 on consumer rights (the Consumer Rights Directive) 
[2011] OJ L304/64 
8  Council Directive (EEC) 85/577 (the Doorstep Selling Directive) and Council Directive 
(EC) 97/7 (the Distance Selling Directive) 
9  Council Directive (EEC) 93/13 (the Unfair Terms Directive) and Council Directive (EC) 
99/44 (the Consumer Guarantees Directive) 
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is the Consumer Guarantees Directive. The CRD had references to after-
sales services, which is an improvement; but the question is whether it is a 
potent enough reference to tackle consumer confidence issues. 
This article aims to provide a closer look into the subject of after-sales 
services for consumer products, and explore the reach of the regulation of 
the Consumer Rights Directive on the area with reference to consumer 
protection in general and consumer confidence in particular. With this 
purpose in mind, first the relevance of the subject in terms of the Internal 
Market will be mentioned, with a particular emphasis on consumer 
confidence. Second, the subject will be tested against the competence of the 
EU vis-à-vis conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality principles. Next, the 
possible solutions referred in the Green Paper will be analysed, and the best 
method to regulate the area will be identified. Then the regulation of the 
Consumer Rights Directive will be examined in this regard and the possible 
improvements will be established. 
THE INTERNAL MARKET & CONSUMER CONFIDENCE 
CORRELATION 
The Internal Market is asserting to be the largest domestic market in the 
industrialised world. This big market was created for a number of reasons, 
the most important of which is the facilitation of Europe’s economic and 
political integration, as can be understood observing the historical 
background. Although European integration commenced for political rather 
than economic reasons,10 the further processes led to the dominance of 
economic integration over the political agenda.11 Economic co-operation was 
viewed as a ‘politically acceptable way of increasing integration while 
laying the groundwork for political co-operation at a future date.’12 
Further integration of the Internal Market demands key actors to 
participate the process. Consumers, who enter into cross-border transactions 
                                                 
10  The leading policy was the need for guaranteeing peace, through a number of co-
operation establishing agreements, following the Second World War.  
11  For further information see: F Scharpf, ‘Negative and Positive Integration’ in Governing 
in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP, Oxford 1999) p.44 
12  A Sbragia, ‘Key Policies’ in E Bomberg and A Stubb (eds), The European Union: How 
Does It Work? (OUP, London 2003) p.119 
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within the EU, are one of the most significant actors that can advance 
integration; while online purchases made through the Internet is the most 
available tool to be used in the process. However, the level of participation 
in cross-border e-commerce within the EU is rather low amongst European 
consumers. The potential of cross-border e-commerce is suppressed by lack 
of consumer confidence. 
There is no established legal definition of ‘consumer confidence’ within 
the EU, although this concept is at the heart of most activities within the 
field of consumer protection. The significance of consumer confidence for 
the EU is due to its key role in facilitating the Internal Market. Therefore it is 
of particular importance in relation to cross-border transactions. 
Consumer confidence may generally be defined as the consumers’ 
perception on the level of credibility of the current and future economic 
outlook. The expression of the sentiment of consumers about the economy is 
generally exposed by the willingness to make purchases. Therefore, when we 
say ‘low levels of consumer confidence’, it refers to ‘consumers’ 
unwillingness to conclude transactions with a variety of traders’. The higher 
the level of consumer confidence, the higher the level of economic activity is. 
The EU consumer policy agenda has long been searching for solutions to 
address the low levels of consumer confidence. With the Internal Market 
concerns in mind, ‘consumer confidence’ is now the core of a new approach 
to consumer protection in the EU. The Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013, 
emphasizing the consumer dimension of the Internal Market, acknowledges 
the fact that “our need for confident consumers to drive our economies has 
never been greater...”.13 Similarly the current European Consumer Agenda 
establishes that “Improving consumer confidence in cross-border shopping 
online by taking appropriate policy action could provide a major boost to 
economic growth in Europe. Empowered and confident consumers can drive 
forward the European economy”. 14 Therefore the current Agenda is built on 
endeavours to identify key policy areas to serve to that end. 
With these activities on one hand, lower levels of consumer confidence 
persist on the other. According to the findings of an extensive survey in the 
                                                 
13  Commission (EC), ‘Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013’ COM (2007) 99 final, 13 
March 2007, p.9 
14  Commission (EC), ‘A European Consumer Agenda- Boosting confidence and growth’ 
COM (2012) 225 final, 22 May 2012, p.1 
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EU, 59 per cent of consumers feel confident buying online from a domestic 
retailer, while only 36 per cent feel the same as regards retailers located in 
another EU country.15 The ratio of consumers who do not feel confident is 
given as 31 per cent and 49 per cent respectively.16 For a fully functioning 
Internal Market the gap between domestic and cross-border sales needs to be 
approximated. Another survey conducted within the EU reveals that an 
average of 27 per cent of the people, who do not use the Internet as a 
shopping medium, cited concerns regarding after-sales services as a reason.17 
It is only logical that should the EU seek to provide a remedy for low levels 
of consumer confidence in cross-border e-commerce, measures that are 
capable of tackling consumer confidence weakening components must be 
taken. 
COMPETENCE OF THE EU TO REGULATE THE AREA 
Before the entry into force of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union)18 most of the consumer law Directives were based on 
Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU). Therefore, any consumer protection 
harmonisation activity based on this Article was constructed on ‘eliminating 
barriers to trade and distortions of competition’ along the lines of ‘Internal 
Market integration’ purpose of the Article. It is observed that this approach 
has not changed in the Consumer Rights Directive. The other legal basis was 
Article 153 EC (now Article 169 TFEU),19 which presented a supplementary 
competence limited to measures designed to ‘support, supplement and 
monitor’ Member States’ policies, and has been hardly ever used as a 
legislative base.20 The fact that this provision embodies a minimum 
                                                 
15  Flash Eurobarometer 358, ‘Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer 
protection’ (Report) (2013) p.23 
16  ibid. 
17  Special Eurobarometer, European Opinion Research Group, ‘European Union Public 
Opinion on Issues Relating to Business to Consumer E-Commerce’ (Executive Summary) 
(2004) p.17 
18  OJ C 306/1 of 17 December 2007 (entered into force on 1 December 2009) 
19  Article 169 TFEU is the renumbered version of Article 153 EC, except for the second 
paragraph, which has been moved to Article 12 TFEU and placed as an individual provision. 
20  Only the Directive on price indications has been based on Article 153 EC. (98/6/EC on 
consumer protection in the indication of the prices offered to consumers [1998] OJ 
L80/27) 
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harmonisation clause21 may also have an effect on this preference, where the 
current trend is maximum harmonisation. 
Although the debate on whether the consumer policy of the EU has an 
autonomous character independent of the Internal Market is still hot, it will 
not be discussed here. It is currently sufficient to mention that of the two 
Articles referred above, Article 95 EC was limited in its scope to market 
integration, while Article 153 EC could only be used in limited 
circumstances. Although set down that it is better avoided to use a double 
legal basis where the measure’s centre of gravity mainly relates to one of the 
relevant matters,22 the ECJ (The Court of Justice of the European Union) 
acknowledges that it is still possible if the act concerns two subjects equally. 
Leaving the discussions on whether a legislation regulating after-sales 
services for consumer products should have a double legal basis or a single 
one (and if so which one) to one side, taking the Internal Market aspect of 
consumer policy in the EU, which was briefly given in the previous section, 
the preferred basis for legislation on after-sales services will be accepted as 
Article 114 TFEU, following the common practice, and in line with the 
Consumer Rights Directive. 
As clearly established, the limits of the competence of the EU is 
governed by the ‘principle of conferral’, according to which, the EU can 
only act within the domain conferred upon it by the Treaties.23 This was also 
reinforced by Art.4 of the TEU, which confirms clearly that ‘competences 
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
States.’ The somewhat complicated division of competence between the EU 
and the Member States have been relatively clarified in the post-Lisbon era 
by the introduction of a competence catalogue in the TFEU. Both ‘internal 
market’ and ‘consumer protection’ have been cited as areas of shared 
competence in Art.2(2) of the TFEU.24 However, the same Article also 
                                                 
21  Article 169(4) provides that measures adopted under Article 169 TFEU “shall not prevent 
any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures.” 
For more information, see: Kathleen Gutman, The Constitutional Foundations of 
European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis (OUP, Oxford 2014) Section 9.3 The 
Scope of Article 169 TFEU, p.409 
22  Case C-178/03 Commission of the European Communities v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-107, para 42 
23  TEU, Article 5 
24  Therefore, even in case of the use of a double legal basis (Internal Market and consumer 
competence) for such an act would be more straightforward, since it could have been 
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stipulates that the Member State can exercise competence only to the extent 
that the EU has not exercised or has decided to cease to exercise its 
competence within any such area. It is this pre-emption rule, which renders 
the competence of the EU constantly expanding against the domain of 
competence of the Member States within the shared competence areas. So 
far it is clear that the subject matter of this paper is in an area on which the 
EU is statutorily competent to act, nevertheless, besides the Member States. 
So this paper will next seek to address the question of who is best to use 
competence to act on after-sales services, the EU or the Member States. 
Confirming the potential competence of the EU on the area, it should now 
be explored whether an EU-wide action was necessary to regulate the area. It 
is the ‘subsidiarity test’ that needs to be applied to answer this question. 
Subsidiarity principle, along with proportionality, is intended to structure 
the exercise of competence. Introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, and retained 
in the Lisbon Treaty, subsidiarity principle has been an important political and 
legal control mechanism.25 It is contained in Art.5(3) TEU: 
3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level. The institutions of the Union shall apply the 
principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments 
ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the 
procedure set out in that Protocol. 
According to this article there are three preconditions for complying 
with the principle of subsidiarity: (a) the area concerned does not fall within 
the Union’s exclusive competence; (b) the objectives of the proposed action 
                                                                                                                   
problematic if one of the matters fell in the exclusive competence area. For more 
information see: Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU Law after 
Lisbon (OUP, Oxford 2012) p.88 
25  Gibson reports that there is a paternalistic assumption that it would be used as a shield to 
protect Euro-sceptics and disenchanted voters against unwarranted and excessive 
interference from Brussels. Leigh Gibson, ‘Subsidiarity: The Implications for Consumer 
Policy’ Journal of Consumer Policy 16:323-344, 1993, 325 
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cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States; (c) the action can 
therefore, by reason of its scale or effects, be implemented more successfully 
by the Union. As confirmed earlier, both ‘internal market’ and ‘consumer 
protection’ have been cited as areas of shared competence in Art.2(2) of the 
TFEU and thus, ‘do not fall within its exclusive competence’, as prescribed 
by the article. Therefore, it needs to be elucidated that whether ‘sufficient 
attainment test’ and ‘better attainment test’ could be met in our case.26 
Despite the difficulty in interpreting the provision, the Commission 
proposed a ‘comparative efficiency test’ that entails the examination of 
factors such as the effect of the scale of the operation (transfrontier 
problems), the costs of inaction, the necessity to maintain a reasonable 
coherence and limits on national action which may cause distortions of the 
end results (where some Member States were able to act and others were 
not) and also the necessity to avoid distortion of competition within the 
Internal Market.27 In the light of this ‘comparative efficiency test’ by the 
Commission, regulation of after-sales services may well be deemed to pass 
the test with its strong transfrontier argument along with its Internal Mar-
ket implications given in the previous section. Moreover, the Guarantees 
Directive was enacted based on the same rationale, hence excluding the 
after-sales provisions. In the Green Paper, the Commission has affirmed 
that: ‘Certain Member States have adopted provisions in this regard, (-
after-sales services-) but in the context of the single market these proposals 
may turn out to be ineffective or even provoke distortions in competition. 
It would be desirable to find a solution at European level.’28 The same 
point was also emphasised in the Preamble of the Consumer Rights 
Directive as: “Certain disparities create significant internal market barriers 
affecting traders and consumers... Disproportionate fragmentation also 
undermines consumer confidence in the internal market.”29 In short, where 
there is an Internal Market efficiency concern, cross-national transactions 
of the consumers become prominent, and this transfrontier aspect requires 
a regulation at Union level. In any case, this test has more of a moral 
                                                 
26  Margot Horspool and Matthew Humphrey, European Union Law (OUP London, 8th Ed. 
2014) p.132 
27  The Principle of Subsidiarity, Communication of the Commission of the European 
Communities, SEC(92) 1990 final, 27 October 1992, p.2  
28  Green Paper, p.16 
29  Preamble of the Consumer Rights Directive, para (6) 
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aspect rather than practical. As the Commission stated: “Subsidiarity 
cannot be reduced to a set of procedural rules; it is primarily a state of 
mind...”.30 
The final test as regards the exercise of competence is ‘proportionality’. 
This principle is embodied in Article5(4) TEU: “Under the principle of 
proportionality, the context and form of Union action shall not exceed what 
is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.” That is to say, the 
content and the form of the action must be in line with the aim pursued. As 
regards the content, the Commission in its Green Paper restricted the subject 
to the services provided in return of a fee, which appears to be followed by 
the CRD too. The propositions given in this paper shall also take 
proportionality concerns into consideration and strive to come up with the 
minimal intervention solution. 
THE GREEN PAPER SOLUTIONS ON THE TABLE: A THOROUGH 
ANALYSIS 
After-sales services for the purpose of the Green Paper, and hence for 
this paper, are to be taken in a narrow sense as to exclude the services for the 
purpose of honouring a guarantee. Therefore, the services under 
consideration are provided in return of a payment. 
The Green Paper made strong emphasis on the subject and went as far 
as to say that a product ‘for which after-sales service is poor or non-existent 
cannot be used in line with the purchaser’s legitimate expectations and may 
thus be considered defective under the terms of the legal guarantee.’31 There 
the after-sales service is legitimately linked to durability expectation from 
the product, and thus the lack of it is considered as a defect in the product. 
The Green Paper also mentions the manufacturers’ role in after-sale services 
by saying that: ‘Both retailers and repair firms rely on the manufacturer, if 
not for technical assistance, at least for the supply of spare parts’.32 In 
addition to these, the Green Paper touched upon the question of 
environmental effect of after-sales services. With an appropriate after-sale 
                                                 
30  Commission Report on the Adaptation of Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity 
Principle, COM (93)545 final, 24 November 1993, p.2 
31  COM (93)509 final, 15 November 1993, p.50 
32  ibid, p.80 
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service, it would be assured that the product will have the optimum lifespan, 
which means a lessened waste and reduced environmental pollution.33 
Here the question arises: what would amount to an ‘appropriate’ after-
sales service? After-sales services basically include providing the stock of 
spare parts and technical assistance necessary for the repair and maintenance 
of the product for a specific period of time. This period of time varies from 
product to product as well as from manufacturer to manufacturer, very much 
depending on the requirements of the legal system indeed. These 
differentiations will be explored shortly, within the inspection of legal paths 
chosen to regulate the after-sales services. In any case, it is important that a 
reasonable after-sales service is provided to the consumers including inter 
alia; the price, speed, and easy accessibility. 
It is not feasible to set patent criteria to assess whether a product can be 
qualified to after-sales services, this needs to be decided individually for 
every product, taking its specifications into consideration. After-sales 
services should be offered for products, which can ‘reasonably’ demand that 
service be available. For instance, this service is not reasonably applicable 
for products such as food products and disposables. On the other hand, most 
products with replaceable parts, consumer electronics and consumer durables 
are subject to after-sales services, unless it is not financially feasible to repair 
the product.34 
To pose the burden of exercising after-sales services on sellers is unjust 
and ineffective as they have no contribution in the manufacturing or 
assembling process of the product. Especially in case of a cross-border sale, 
which is made through distance selling methods, generally consumers can no 
longer turn to sellers as regards after-sales services. In such a cross-border 
trading panorama, manufacturers start to become the real actors with 
growing essential responsibilities. In the end, sellers are customarily local,35 
where manufacturers’ facilities often spread out of the national borders. 
                                                 
33  ibid. Though it operates against the desire of most producers, who are inclined to promote 
the consumption society habits that prefer getting rid of broken items and replacing them 
with a new one instead of repairing. 
34  The costs of fixing some low value products, and especially the electrical products, may 
be more expensive than the actual price of that product. Therefore, it would not be fiscally 
viable to provide after-sales services for such products. 
35  This statement excludes the retailers who sell through the Internet and have the capability 
to operate in a wider market than they could possibly achieve through their local shops.  
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Therefore, providing an appropriate after-sales service should reasonably be 
the built-in responsibility of the manufacturers. 
Besides the representation of the need to regulate the area due to its 
substance-related importance, this was also addressed to be essential in terms 
of Internal Market purposes. Each Member State has a different practice as 
regards after-sales services. This diverse situation was referred as having the 
possibility to end up with ineffective national laws, if not presenting a 
potential distortion to competition, in the context of Single Market.36 
Therefore, it was suggested to be treated within the EU. 
Until recently, after-sales services in the EU had been operating through 
commitments and codes of conduct. This situation in fact represents one of 
the possible regimes to regulate the area, the voluntary regime, introduced by 
the Green Paper. This regime works through commitments such as codes of 
conduct or direct negotiation of the businesses with the consumers.37 Self-
help and growth of codes of conduct has been encouraged by the EU, 
however as a supplementary to legal regulations, as over-regulation is sought 
to be avoided. On the other hand, as operating on the basis of voluntary 
participation, it causes doubts on the level of protection it can offer to 
consumers. It may be said that the weakness of this regime lies in its 
capacity. It is noteworthy that, consumer related regulations are generally of 
mandatory nature, owing to their protective rationale. At any rate, it is 
evident by the survey results that, the self regulatory system was far from 
providing the desired level of confidence for the consumers.38 
There are two other possible solutions referred in the Green Paper. First 
one is the stringent regime with a regulatory approach.39 There the 
manufacturer is obliged with stocking the necessary spare parts during a 
certain period of time from the date they stop selling the product.40 This is a 
product-specific period assessed according to the normal lifespan of a 
product. Some national level laws in the Member States already have 
                                                 
36  Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-sales Services (1993) p.16 
37  ibid, p.100 
38  Special Eurobarometer, ‘European Union Public Opinion on Issues Relating to Business 
to Consumer E-Commerce’ (2004) p.17 
39  Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-sales Services (1993) p.100 
40  The question regarding ‘the date the manufacturer stop selling the product’ will be 
discussed below. 
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provisions to secure an appropriate after-sales service for the lifespan of a 
product. Each law sets varied, but corresponding prescriptions for defining 
the lifespan period of a product. In Greece, they employ ‘customary’ lifespan 
formula,41 and in Portugal they exercise ‘average’ lifespan,42 whereas Irish 
law prescribes ‘reasonable’ period test.43 Whatever method is followed, 
calculating this period, the nature of the product should be taken into 
account, assuming an average or even low usage in order to extend the range 
of protection to include consumers, who use their products seldom. 
The question of what the normal or expected lifespan of a product could 
be pre-assessed or post-assessed. The pre-assessment could be made through 
technical harmonisation by European standardisation organisations, or an ad 
hoc institution set up for that purpose.44 Doubtlessly the application of the 
stringent regime would ensure a higher level of legal protection, however, 
bringing about not only an intervention to the liberated markets, but also too 
much bureaucracy with it, which are not desirable. Otherwise, the 
interpretation of the normal lifespan for a product could be left to the 
discretion of the manufacturers and in case of a conflict, could be post-
assessed by the courts on case basis. Yet, this would drastically increase the 
burden of the courts, which is not advantageous in terms of procedural 
economy, let alone the vast diversity of judgments. 
The second solution was introduced as being purely information 
oriented.45 This scheme operates as the manufacturers voluntarily declare a 
specific period of time until when they would provide spare parts for the 
product in question. This declaration would be made on the labelling of the 
product. This information would provide market transparency and enable the 
                                                 
41  Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-sales Services (1993) p.51 
42  ibid 
43  Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 (Ireland), Article 12 
44  In Turkish law, the Code on Consumer Protection Art.58 (1) requires manufacturers and 
importers to provide after-sales services for their products for the duration of the lifespan 
of their product, which is pre-assessed and published by the Ministry of Customs and 
Trade, annexed to the Regulation on After-Sales Services. In the annex there is a list that 
shows the products, for which providing after-sales services is compulsory by law. It also 
contains information on the assessed lifespan and maximum allowed service duration for 
every product type, from sunglasses to digital photo frames, and from guitars to toilet 
seats. The manufacturers or the importers are also required to obtain an approved ‘after-
sales services credential’ for the listed products.  
45  Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-sales Services (1993) p.100 
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consumers to make informed choices. Thereby the freedom of providing 
after-sales services would be established, which also includes the freedom to 
decide on whether to provide the service at all. Thus, the manufacturers of 
low value products would also be liberated from liability, where the 
manufacturers of very long life span products, such as houses, would be 
ensured to undertake a reasonable period of after-sales service in line with 
their availabilities. The liability of manufacturers of buildings (constructers) 
and such similar long lifespan products as regards after-sales services should 
be restricted with a longstop provision for the sake of fairness. This would 
on the other hand, not deprive the consumers of their chance to have their 
houses repaired or maintained, as this service is generally available from 
various suppliers. 
Evaluating the above mentioned systems, the information oriented 
regime appears to be the most favourable one as compromising the 
competing rights of both the consumers and the businesses, while allowing a 
smooth operation of a fully competitive Internal Market. This scheme 
enables the consumers to be informed of their rights concerning the after-
sales services of the specific product that they have bought. Incorporating 
the information regarding the duration and coverage of the after-sales 
services for that particular product to the labelling of the product itself, 
would provide a knowledge-based security for the consumers, without the 
necessity to giving up a free, competitive market, which is of particular 
importance for the Internal Market purposes. This would also be easily 
considered to have met the ‘proportionality test’ requirement in terms of the 
exercise of the competence by the EU. 
By putting this information on the labelling of the product it produces, 
the manufacturer assumes liability from this product and its maintenance. 
This information labelled on the product is the declaration of a unilateral 
undertaking by the manufacturer, which would certainly have legal results. 
One should be careful in legally classifying this declaration. This 
declaration, as being a component of the labelling, could also be argued to 
constitute a part of the sale contract. From what we infer from the wording 
of Consumer Guarantees Directive, the statements in advertising or on 
labelling can be constituents of sale contract.46 However, it should be 
highlighted that, the sale contract is concluded between the seller and the 
                                                 
46  Consumer Guarantees Directive (1999), Article 2(2)(d) 
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consumer, where the product is usually labelled by the manufacturer. 
Moreover, the undertaking as regards the after-sales services is purely 
concerning the manufacturer itself. In this case, to hold the seller liable with 
non-conformity with the contract due to non-complying with the after-sales 
duties, in line with the Consumer Guarantees Directive, would be unfair. In 
accordance with this outlook, it may be argued that, such a declaration 
labelled on the product would constitute the terms of a contract between the 
manufacturer and the consumer, which burdens a one-sided fulfilment upon 
the manufacturer. This could be qualified as a sui generis unilateral 
consumer contract. The contract would be concluded once the consumer 
purchases the labelled product.47 Therefore, we may say that the formation 
of this contract depends on the conclusion of the sale contract. They are in 
some way connected, although technically being independent contracts. 
Consequently, the contract between the consumer and the manufacturer as 
regards the provision of after-sales services is established with the formation 
of the sale contract and becomes independent afterwards. 
As we have previously referred, the liability of the manufacturer for 
providing after-sales services, if he assumed, goes on for a specific period of 
time after the date the manufacturer stopped selling the product. This 
specific period of time is determined by the declaration of the manufacturer, 
which was shown on the labelling of the product in this information based 
regime. However, the date the manufacturer stopped selling the product does 
not usually correspond to the date the retailers stop selling. In other words, it 
is likely that the sellers will sell the product after the manufacturer 
discontinues. This may cause problems where a retailer sells the 
discontinued declared product of the manufacturer long after the date the 
manufacturer stops selling, and the consumer who buys the product turns to 
the manufacturer for after-sales services after the expiration of the liability 
period as to the date the manufacturer stopped selling that product. In such a 
case to not the limit the responsibility of the manufacturer for providing 
after-sales services could cause unfair results for the manufacturers. 
In order to avoid from actually reasonable claims of the consumers that 
could be unfair on the manufacturers, the manufacturers can call in their 
                                                 
47  In this hypothesis, the placing of its products on the market for the purpose of eventually 
being sold to consumers, the manufacturer makes an ‘offer’; and when the product is 
finally purchased by the consumer, it constitutes ‘acceptance’ by conduct.  
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products once they decide to stop selling a product and get out of liability 
from providing after-sales services for that product by the termination of the 
undertaken period. To ensure that the sellers return the called in products, 
the manufacturer could place a term in their contract with the sellers, to 
make it mandatory for the sellers. In this way, even if a product was sold to a 
consumer despite the manufacturer’s earlier call, the manufacturer would 
have a right of recourse against the seller, who breached the contract.48 
Where the goods reach the consumers through long chain of contracts, this 
condition would be difficult to maintain for the manufacturers. In order to 
overcome this difficulty, the manufacturer can place an extra term in the sale 
contract stating that ‘the sale’ is made with the condition that the provision 
regarding the obligation ‘to return the called in product to the manufacturer’ 
will be required to be placed in the future sale contracts of ‘the seller’ 
concerning ‘the goods’ subject to that initial sale contract. 
Another method to implement could be to ensure that the goods in the 
market are depleted by sale. This could be made indirectly, by means of 
various marketing techniques. The sales can be improved by magnetising 
consumers through attractive offers and prices. In this way the goods in the 
market will be exhausted through sale, which would arguably be more 
profitable for the manufacturers compared to ‘calling in’ the products. 
THE CONSUMER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE: THE REVIVAL OF 
AFTER-SALES SERVICES? 
The long ignored subject of after-sales services following the Green 
Paper discussions finally found its way into the Consumer Rights Directive, 
as opposed to many other issues intended for.49 In the CRD we observe two 
sets of references regarding the after-sales services. The first one is 
embodied in Art.5, which is on ‘information requirements for contracts other 
than distance or off-premises contracts’.50 The provision stipulates that the 
trader shall provide the consumer with the information on the ‘existence and 
                                                 
48  This solution is also applicable within the stringent regime. 
49  Weatherill comments that the CRD ‘is trivial in content’ as opposed to its ‘grandiose title’ 
and explores the reasons for the relative failure of the ambitious project it was based on. 
For more info see: Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive: How and Why a 
Quest for “Coherence” has Largely Failed’ (2012) 49 Common Market Review 1279-1318 
50  Article 5(1)e of the Consumer Rights Directive 
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the conditions of after-sales services and commercial guarantees, where 
applicable’ before the consumer is bound with such a contract. Similarly the 
other reference is in Art.6 under the subtitle of ‘information requirements for 
distance and off-premises contracts’, which provides that the trader shall 
provide the consumer with the information on ‘where applicable, the 
existence and the conditions of after-sale customer assistance, after-sales 
services and commercial guarantees’ prior to the conclusion of the 
contract.51 Both provisions lay down pre-contractual information 
requirements, one for contracts other than distance or off-premises contracts, 
where the other is for distance and off-premises contracts. 
It is good to see that the Commission finally decided to take action on 
the subject, and what is more to opt-in for the most sensible option discussed 
in the Green Paper, the information-oriented method. As explored in the 
previous section, this method facilitates a more liberal, transparent and 
competitive market, avoiding excessive intervention. It also contributes to 
the well-functioning of the Internal Market by means of empowering 
consumers through information. 
None of the two provisions on after-sales services have been exempt 
from the maximum harmonisation level envisaged by the CRD.52 Hence, 
Member States cannot maintain or introduce more or less stringent 
provisions in their national laws. This impedes the existence of divergent set 
of rules across the EU, yet at the cost of prevention of more protective 
measures. 
Looking further into the CRD, a penalty provision strikes attention. It 
makes reference to potential infringements of provisions set out in the CRD, 
and stipulates that the Member States are required to take all necessary 
measures to ensure that ‘effective, proportional and dissuasive’ penalties that 
are capable of tackling such infringements are introduced in their national 
legal systems.53 
This opens up the subject of the remedies of the consumer for non-
conformity with the after-sales services commitment declared on the 
labelling of a product. This may well be deemed as non-performance of a 
                                                 
51  Article 6(1)m of the Consumer Rights Directive 
52  Article 4 of the Consumer Rights Directive 
53  Article 24(1) of the Consumer Rights Directive 
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contract in line with our previously explained hypothetical contract 
concluded between the manufacturer and the consumer. As we have clarified 
above, this is an undertaking by the manufacturer, which cannot be claimed 
against the seller. However, the manufacturer may establish some separate 
departments or appoint some authorised companies to maintain the after-
sales services for that product. 
The four remedies cited in the Consumer Guarantees Directive, namely, 
repair, replacement, refund of the price paid and rescission of the sale 
contract,54 would not be appropriate where the manufacturer fails to honour 
the commitment he has voluntarily burdened. Repair cannot reasonably be a 
remedy, since if it could have been done, the after-sales service would 
probably be carried out, which is the likely cause of a dispute. On the other 
hand, the product may not be in need of repair, but only need a spare part or 
supplements; which in any case cannot be remedied through repairs. 
Replacement of a product is also not a sensible remedy for non-
complying with after-sales services. One may argue that this would also not 
be desirable for the consumer, as the reliability of the product would be 
drastically lowered. Considering his position, how the consumer could have 
benefited from the replaced product is highly questionable. Would the 
replacement product be under the legal guarantee? What if the replacement 
product is faulty? Yet it should be credulity to expect after-sales services for 
a product replaced due to non-conformity with after-sales services promise. 
Refund of the price paid, on the other hand, would not be a valid 
remedy, since the price was paid in return of the product itself in terms of 
the contract of sale, which was actually obtained. The price paid is the 
counter performance of transfer and handling of the product purchased. In 
this case the parties -the seller and the purchaser- have carried out their 
contractual obligations, and the sale contract has been terminated with full 
performance. The promise of carrying out after-sales services is not made in 
return of a payment from the consumer, but it can be argued that it is made 
in return of consumer preference of that product. As we continuously stress, 
to carry out the after-sales services should not be an obligation of the seller. 
Therefore, any kind of payment that may be made by the manufacturer to 
the consumer as a remedy would not really represent ‘refund of the price 
                                                 
54  Article 3 of the Consumer Guarantees Directive 
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paid’. By way of similitude, to rescind the sale contract on basis of failure 
to comply with after-sales services is not applicable, as it is not related to 
the sale contract. 
So, what remedies can the consumers be awarded with where no or poor 
after-sales services is the case? The product that requires after-sales service 
may be in need of a spare part only. In that case if the manufacturer cannot 
provide a spare part, one cannot ask or force the manufacturer to make one. 
Similarly if the product needs repairing or maintenance, and the 
manufacturer do not have the technical knowledge, equipment or trained 
staff to carry out this task, this is a matter of capacity, which cannot be 
forced to go beyond. However, if the repair could have been done by a third 
party, the manufacturer could be asked to have the product repaired at his 
cost. Similarly, if an aftermarket replacement to those of the manufacturer’s 
parts is available, the consumer may ask the manufacturer to supply it for 
him, provided that it perfectly fits the product and would not have a negative 
effect in the appearance and performance. 
Else than that, the most practical option remains as compensating the 
consumer for failure to provide after-sales services. It could have been 
worthwhile to see what the CRD has readily offered in practice in the 
Member States; however such information is not yet made available by the 
Commission. Nevertheless, it would not be wrong to assume that the 
Member States have probably prescribed compensation for the breach of 
information requirements with reference to after-sales services per se.55 
Assessing the nature and the quantum of the compensation, the 
guidance of the ‘effective, proportional and dissuasive’ penalties criteria of 
the CRD could be useful to follow. The present author believes that when 
calculating the amount of the compensation consideration could also be 
given to the following facts: 
- The consumer is likely to be put in a situation where, he was induced 
to buy a new product to substitute the non-serviced one, which was 
not planned for the consumer for that time. 
                                                 
55  For instance the UK has implemented the information provisions of the CRD in its 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 
2013, which gives the consumers a right to claim compensation from traders who do not 
live up to the information provided prior to the conclusion of the contract. 
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- Failure to provide after-sales services within the stated period of time 
constitutes the non-performance of a contractual obligation by the 
manufacturer. 
- The terms of this contract, however, have also influenced the 
consumer when making a purchase decision in the initial stage. 
- The manufacturer was completely free when pledging to provide 
after-sales services and declaring its terms. 
- Not to satisfy this promise also causes unfair competition. 
Guaranteeing things that would never be complied with, awards an 
undeserved advantage among competitors. 
- Where this declaration is also advertised by any means, non-fulfilment 
could at the same time be treated as misleading advertising. 
Taking the gravity of these facts into account, it is expected that the 
remedy should be deterrent. Therefore, determining the compensation, an 
award with a punitive aspect added would be an appropriate attitude to 
employ. It is also consistent with the ‘penalty’ prescription of the CRD. 
Moreover, such a formulation would satisfy ‘effectiveness’, ‘proportionality’ 
and ‘dissuasiveness’ tests of such penalties. Calculating the amount, criteria 
to compromise them all could be taken as the price of a brand new 
equivalent of the product, for which after-sales services could not be 
provided. This test would well be able to remedy the consumer as it awards 
the amount that allows him to buy a brand new equivalent product, while 
penalising the manufacturer. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The regulation of after-sales services for consumer products have long 
been neglected by the EU. The Green Paper 1993 of the Commission had 
brought the subject up for discussion, yet resulted in inaction for some 
reason. It was finally back in the EU’s agenda after nearly two decades. It is 
now regulated by the CRD, which took effect as of 13 June 2014. 
The provisions of the CRD reflect the information oriented regime, one 
of the three methods of action introduced by the Green Paper. This regime 
with its liberated approach is more favourable compared to the others 
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presented in the Green Paper. The information-based regime is more 
powerful than the mere codes of conduct and soft-law option, but weaker in 
comparison with the stringent regime. Then why the best? 
The power of this regime lies in its capability to regulate with minimal 
intervention to the market. It enables increased market transparency, while 
enhancing consumers’ ability to choose effectively between different 
products and services. However, the full potential of such a liberal regime 
could only be achieved if the compliance with it would be strongly ensured. 
The present author believes that the relative weakness of this regime could 
be counterbalanced in that way. The key to ensure compliance could be 
employing efficient and dissuasive sanctions, which are not excessive, when 
breaches occur. This could be translated into practice as awarding the 
consumer with a higher amount of compensation, which encompasses a 
punitive value added. It could also foster consumer confidence, which in 
return means consumers that are more likely to take part in cross-border 
transactions and contribute to the functioning of the Internal Market. This is 
a valuable input for the EU, and an opportunity to seize, with the support and 
confidence in the Internal Market is currently reduced.56 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Biondi, A., Eeckhout, P., and Ripley, S. (eds), EU Law after Lisbon 
(OUP, Oxford 2012) 
Case C-178/03 Commission of the European Communities v European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-107 
Code on Consumer Protection (No:6502) 2013 (Turkey) 
Commission (EC), ‘A European Consumer Agenda- Boosting 
confidence and growth’ COM (2012) 225 final, 22 May 2012 
Commission (EC), ‘Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013’ COM (2007) 
99 final, 13 March 2007 
                                                 
56  Monti diagnoses the situation and states that “The single market today is less popular than 
ever, while Europe needs it more than ever.’ M. Monti, ‘A New Strategy for the Single 
Market – At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’ (Report for the European 
Commission) (9 May 2010) p.6 
MÜHF – HAD, C. 20, S. 3 
 
24 
Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods 
and After-sales Services’ COM (93) 509 final, 15 November 1993 
Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer 
Acquis’ COM (2006) 744 final, 8 February 2007 
Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive on consumer rights’ COM 
(2008) 614 final, 8 October 2008 
Commission (EC), ‘Second Commission Three-Year Action Plan 
(1993-1995)’ COM (93) 378 final, 28 July 1993 
Commission (EEC), ‘Three Year Action Plan of Consumer Policy in the 
EEC (1990-1992)’ COM (1990) 98 final, 3 May 1990 
Commission Communication on ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ SEC 
(92) 1990 final, 27 October 1992 
Commission Report on the Adaptation of Community Legislation to the 
Subsidiarity Principle, COM (93)545 final, 24 November 1993 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional 
Charges) Regulations 2013 (the UK) 
Council Directive (EC) 97/7 on the protection of consumers in respect 
of distance contracts (the Distance Selling Directive) [1997] OJ L144/19 
Council Directive (EC) 98/6 on consumer protection in the indication of 
the prices offered to consumers [1998] OJ L80/27 
Council Directive (EC) 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer 
goods and associated guarantees (the Consumer Guarantees Directive) 
[1999] OJ L171/12 
Council Directive (EEC) 85/577 to protect consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises (the Doorstep Selling 
Directive) [1985] OJ L372/31 
Council Directive (EEC) 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
(the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive) [1993] OJ L95/29 
Council Directive (EU) 2011/83 on consumer rights (the Consumer 
Rights Directive) [2011] OJ L304/64 
Flash Eurobarometer 358, ‘Consumer attitudes towards cross-border 
trade and consumer protection’ (Report) (2013) 
Dr. Deniz Tekin Apaydın 
The EU Regulation On After-Sales Services in The Consumer Rights Directive: 
Missed or Seized The Opportunity? 
25 
Gibson, L., ‘Subsidiarity: The Implications for Consumer Policy’ 
Journal of Consumer Policy 16:323-344, 1993 
Gutman, K., The Constitutional Foundations of European Contract 
Law: A Comparative Analysis (OUP, Oxford 2014) 
Horspool, M. and Humphrey, M., European Union Law (OUP London, 
8th Ed. 2014) 
Monti, M., ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market – At the Service of 
Europe’s Economy and Society’ (Report for the European Commission) (9 
May 2010) 
Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 (Ireland) 
Sbragia, A., ‘Key Policies’ in E Bomberg and A Stubb (eds), The 
European Union: How Does It Work? (OUP, London 2003) 
Scharpf, F., ‘Negative and Positive Integration’ in Governing in 
Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP, Oxford 1999) 
Special Eurobarometer, ‘European Union Public Opinion on Issues 
Relating to Business to Consumer E-Commerce’ (2004) 
Special Eurobarometer, European Opinion Research Group, ‘European 
Union Public Opinion on Issues Relating to Business to Consumer E-
Commerce’ (Executive Summary) (2004) 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 306/1 of 17 
December 2007 
Weatherill, S., ‘The Consumer Rights Directive: How and Why a Quest 
for “Coherence” has Largely Failed’ (2012) 49 Common Market Review 
1279-1318 
 
 
